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In Vedanta v Lungowe, the United Kingdom Supreme Court determined that civil 
claims for negligence brought by Zambian claimants against an English parent company 
(Vedanta) and its Zambian subsidiary (Konkola Copper Mines plc, “KCM”) for damages 
experienced in Zambia can proceed in English courts.1 While framed as a domestic tort law 
case, the decision is significant for international efforts aimed at holding businesses 
accountable for their “negative impacts” on human rights.2 Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Lord Briggs’s judgment hinged narrowly on the right of victims to access substantial 
justice. More broadly, Lord Briggs suggested that parent companies that hold themselves 
out in public disclosures as overseeing the human rights, environmental, social, or labor 
standards employed by their subsidiaries assume a duty of care to those harmed by the 
subsidiary. This suggestion has the potential to transform current corporate approaches to 
human rights due diligence and accountability.  
The plaintiffs are 1,826 Zambians, mostly farmers, who live in four communities 
in the country’s Chingola District. The claimants allege that the Nchanga Copper Mine 
polluted watercourses they rely on for personal consumption and for farming purposes. 
 
1
 Vedanta Resources Plc and another v Lungowe and others, Judgment of 10 April 2019, [2019] UKSC 20.  
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 As businesses do not have obligations under international law, the leading authority on business 
responsibilities for human rights under international law, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, have adopted the term “impacts” rather than “abuses” or “breaches.” U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011), Principles 3(d), 11, 13, and the 
official Commentary to these Principles. This leads to complex questions about what constitutes an “impact.” 
For an extensive examination of that issue, see David Birchall, Any Act, Any Harm, to Anyone: The 
Transformative Potential of ‘Human Rights Impacts’ under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB JOURNAL 120 (2019).    
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KCM owns and operates the Nchanga Copper mine; Vedanta and the Zambian government 
jointly own KCM. While KCM is a joint enterprise, the Court noted that “materials 
published by Vedanta state that its ultimate control of KCM is not … to be regarded as any 
less than it would be if wholly owned” (para. 2). The claimants argue that Vedanta set 
health, safety, and environmental standards that KCM was to comply with, and exercised 
a “very high level of control and direction” over the subsidiary (para. 3). 
The defendants’ appeal 3  centered on an assertion that the claimants were 
wrongfully pursuing Vedanta in order to force KCM to defend itself in English courts. The 
Court’s judgment discusses two issues that are significant for international and 
transnational law.4 First, the Court outlines the standards by which to assess a parent 
company’s responsibility for harms caused by its subsidiaries in common law negligence. 
This issue is significant for international human rights law, in particular for implementation 
of the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding 
Principles”).5 Second, in considering whether England or Zambia is the “proper place” to 
hear claims against KCM, the Court affirmed an approach that recognizes that claimants 
can only be guaranteed “substantial justice” in jurisdictions where they have access to 
appropriate legal representation.   
 
 
3
 Technically, each defendant brought its own appeal, but the Court concluded that the two appeals should 
be treated as one. Vedanta, supra n 1 at para. 15. 
4
 The judgment also addresses two legal issues that are internal to either the European Union (EU) or Zambia: 
how to reconcile English common law standards with EU rules on jurisdiction; and the potential for a 
statutory duty under Zambia’s mining laws. This note sets these two issues aside. 
5
 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) 
(“UNGP”). 
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Parent Company Liability 
 The defendants argued that the claimants pursued Vedanta for the purpose of 
securing English jurisdiction over their real target, Vedanta’s subsidiary KCM. The 
claimants’ case against Vedanta rested largely on several group-wide policies and 
guidelines adopted by the parent company regarding operations and management at the 
mining sites. Applying Zambian law, the trial court found that Zambian courts would 
arguably interpret principles of negligence in line with the English common law (para. 56). 
The trial court also concluded that Vedanta’s group-wide policies created a real, triable 
issue against the parent company (para. 24). The claimants’ interest in pursuing Vedanta 
therefore included, but extended beyond, the benefit of securing the court’s jurisdiction 
over KCM.  
On appeal, the defendants argued that using group-wide policies to find that 
Vedanta owed a duty of care for the impact of its subsidiary would require creating “a new 
category of common law negligence” (para. 49). Lord Briggs rejected this assertion. While 
a parent company can influence the conduct of its subsidiary, English common law does 
not require it to do so. Whether the parent assumes a duty of care towards third parties 
“depends on the extent to which, and the way in which, the parent availed itself of the 
opportunity to take over, intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of the 
relevant operations (including land use) of the subsidiary” (para. 49). The claims against 
Vedanta rested not on the fact that it owned KCM. That relationship merely creates an 
opportunity for the parent to control the subsidiary’s operations. Lord Briggs identified 
three means by which group-wide policies could give rise to a duty of care for the conduct 
of a subsidiary: (1) where the guidance itself is defective; (2) where the “parent does not 
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merely proclaim them, but takes active steps” to ensure the guidance is implemented; and 
(3) where the parent “in published materials … holds itself out as exercising that degree of 
supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in fact do so” (paras. 52-53). 
It is clear that Lord Briggs did not intend for this to be an exhaustive list, but rather 
representative of how a parent company might assume a duty of care distinct from but 
related to its subsidiaries.  
 
Proper Place and Substantial Justice 
 The second significant finding concerns the Court’s examination of the appropriate 
venue for the case against KCM. Under the European Union’s (“EU”) Recast Brussels 
Regulation, allegations against EU companies can be (and, in many circumstances, must 
be) brought in the courts of the Member State in which the business is domiciled (the “home 
state”).6 The Court of Justice for the European Union has determined that this confers a 
right on non-EU claimants to file claims against a business in its home state.7 The rules of 
civil procedure for England and Wales provide that a claim against an English defendant 
can “anchor” the case, allowing the courts to exercise jurisdiction over another “necessary 
or proper party” to the claim (para. 15).8 The rules prohibit a court from exercising this 
authority unless it is “satisfied that England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring 
the claim.”9 This rule of “forum conveniens” requires courts to consider various factors 
that relate to the interests of the courts and the burden placed on the parties by litigating in 
 
6
 Recast Brussels Regulation, EU 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at articles 4(1), 8. 
7
 European Court of Justice, Owusu v Jackson, C-281/02 (2005). 
8
 Civil Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 6B. 
9
 Civil Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 6.37(3). 
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any of the potential jurisdictions in which the case could be heard. One factor that is often 
given prominence is the risk of duplicative processes and conflicting judgments. Finally, 
the court may allow a case to proceed where it would otherwise find another forum proper 
if “there is a real risk that substantial justice will not be obtainable in that foreign 
jurisdiction” (para. 88). 
 The trial judge found that Zambia would be the proper place for the case against 
KCM but for the “closely related claim against Vedanta” (para. 71). The risk of 
irreconcilable judgments led the Court to conclude that the case against KCM should be 
heard in England. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the claimants would be denied 
“access to justice” if the case were heard in Zambia because they would be unable to secure 
a suitable and experienced legal team to represent them (para. 82).  
On appeal, the defendants advanced two arguments. First, they asserted, that the 
trial court’s approach would mean that “the risk of irreconcilable judgments is likely to be 
decisive in every case” where EU law provides a claimant with the right to sue other 
defendants in England or Wales (para. 78). Second, they claimed that the trial judge did 
not pay sufficient attention to issues of international comity and inappropriately considered 
the problems the claimants would face in financing and accessing legal representation.  
 First, Lord Briggs found the trial court erred in concluding that England is the 
“proper place” for the case. The risk of irreconcilable judgments does not transform the 
right to sue one defendant in English courts into a right to sue all defendants in England. 
While this risk is a significant factor, the weight it is to be given depends on the availability 
of an alternative forum that all defendants accept (paras. 81-83). Vedanta was willing to 
submit to Zambia’s jurisdiction. The claimants are under no obligation to accept that offer, 
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but Lord Briggs determined that Vedanta’s willingness to defend itself in Zambia presented 
the claimants with a choice. They could either pursue separate cases in England and 
Zambia, risking irreconcilable judgments, or they could choose to pursue a single case 
against both defendants in Zambia and avoid the risk (para. 82). The risk of irreconcilable 
judgments may still be considered by the lower court, but given the circumstances in this 
case, it is only one factor that should not be given priority over others (para. 84). 
 Many of the connecting factors at hand pointed to Zambia as the “proper place”: 
the applicable law; the place of the causation and harm; that many of the claimants do not 
speak English, would need translation, and would have difficulty traveling from Zambia to 
England; the location of many witnesses; the need to translate documentary evidence; and 
that a Zambian judgment is enforceable in English courts. Documents and relevant Vedanta 
employees are likely to be located in England, but modern technology makes it easy to 
address these factors in order to ensure the case proceeded appropriately. Consequently, 
Lord Briggs concluded, “[i]f substantial justice was available to the parties in Zambia as it 
is in England, it would offend the common sense of all reasonable observers to think that 
the proper place for this litigation to be conducted was England” (para. 87).  
 When examining the issue of substantial justice, however, Lord Briggs found the 
lower court had appropriately analyzed the law. The trial court found that most forms of 
litigation funding in Zambia were unavailable in this case. The only available means of 
financing the lawsuit “would not attract a legal team which was both prepared to act, and 
able to do so with the requisite resources and experience” (para. 93). This proved crucial 
to both the trial court and Lord Briggs. The litigation is expected to be complex and to 
demand significant disbursements for expert evidence and analysis. Lord Briggs found that 
7 
 
 
the trial court had rightly considered “whether the unavoidable scale and complexity of this 
case (wherever litigated) could be undertaken at all with the limited funding and legal 
resources” available to the claimants in Zambia (para. 95). Without judging the Zambian 
legal system, the trial judge concluded that the claimants in this particular case could not 
secure the legal representation necessary with the funding available to them (para. 97). This 
was, according to Lord Briggs, an appropriate approach for the trial judge to take and 
justified the exercise of jurisdiction. 
****  
In many respects, Vedanta is a rather mundane case about the difficult but routine 
considerations a domestic court must undertake in transnational cases where the parties 
disagree about which forum is preferable. Yet, the Supreme Court’s findings may have a 
profound impact on business and human rights, a subfield of international human rights 
law.  
The 2011 Guiding Principles provide an authoritative understanding of the 
responsibilities and obligations in this area. They recognize the existing obligations on 
states to protect human rights by regulating the conduct of businesses and to ensure victims 
whose human rights are harmed by businesses have access to effective remedies. 10 
Businesses, on the other hand, have a responsibility to respect human rights by adopting 
policies and practices that identify and mitigate any risks they pose.11 Where a business 
causes or contributes to a negative impact, it should ensure the victims can access 
appropriate remedies. Businesses are to consider their direct and indirect impacts, 
examining not only their own operations but also how their business partners impact human 
 
10
 See, UNGP, supra n 3 at Principle 1.   
11
 Ibid at Principle 11. 
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rights.12 Among other things, this means that parent companies should address the impacts 
of their subsidiaries.13 While the need to secure remedies for victims is central to the 
Guiding Principles, it has often been the “forgotten pillar,”14 and there remains a disconnect 
between the international expectations and the ability of victims to enforce those 
expectations through domestic legal systems.  
The legal principle states that shareholders are not liable for the acts of a company 
in which they invest poses a particular challenge for victims, for whom the direct cause of 
the harm is usually a local subsidiary.15 Local courts may not have jurisdiction over the 
deeper pockets of the known and branded parent company, whose home state may also be 
unable or unwilling to hold the business accountable. Conversely, the parent company’s 
home state is unlikely to have – and is often unwilling to assert – jurisdiction over the acts 
of an overseas subsidiary. Merely finding a venue in which victims can bring their claims 
can therefore be daunting. 
In the 1990s, victims and their advocates responded to this challenge by bringing 
claims against corporations and other business entities under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”). The ATS allows foreigners to sue in U.S. federal courts for violations of 
customary international law.16 Claimants often – and controversially – invoked the statute 
to encourage US courts to hear claims against parent and subsidiary corporations for 
injuries occurring in other countries. Never an ideal tool for redressing human rights 
 
12
 Ibid at Principle 13. 
13
 Ibid at Principle 14. 
14
 See Lorna McGregor, Activating the Third Pillar of the UNGPs on Access to an Effective Remedy, 
EJIL:TALK! (November 23, 2018), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/activating-the-third-pillar-of-the-
ungps-on-access-to-an-effective-remedy/ (last accessed October 3, 2019).  
15
 For an extensive examination of this issue, see Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking the Limited Liability of Parent 
Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1769 (2015).  
16
 28 U.S.C. §1350. 
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violations by businesses,17 the US Supreme Court sharply curtailed the utility of the ATS 
for such claims in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,18 and Jesner v. Arab Bank.19  
As use of the ATS became more difficult, claimants and their representatives began 
to consider European courts as potential venues for business and human rights litigation. 
Cases in England have generally focused on proving a parent company assumed a duty of 
care, often by relying on a parent company’s claims that they control or oversee the conduct 
of subsidiaries in areas of particular sensitivity, including economic and social 
governance.20 It is common for parent companies to assert robust group-wide policies on 
these issues. Until now, it was unclear how much weight a trial court should give to such 
public statements. Companies have often claimed that these statements do not create an 
assumption of responsibility for those the policies are supposedly protecting. The UK 
Supreme Court’s decision indicates that what parent companies might have viewed as 
“puffery” is actually an assumption of responsibility that gives rise to a duty of care. 
Businesses are not yet required by English law to engage in human rights due diligence or 
related activities like environmental governance, but they can be held to the standards they 
claim to observe.  
Additionally, the Court’s recognition that concerns over “substantial justice” arise 
when claimants are unable to secure appropriate legal counsel for complex claims may 
prove important in future business and human rights cases. These claims are often time-
 
17
 For more on the limitations of the ATS, see Agora: Reflections on Kiobel, 107 AJIL UNBOUND (2013), 
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/ajil-unbound-
by-symposium/agora-reflections-on-kiobel (last accessed October 3, 2019). 
18
 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
19
 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). See also Rebecca J. Hamilton, Jesner v. Arab Bank, 112 AJIL 720 (2018). 
20
 For other examples, see, e.g., Court of Appeal, Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; Court of 
Appeal, AAA & others v. Unilever Plc and Unilever Tea Kenya Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 1532; Court of 
Appeal, Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 191 (right to appeal granted by the UK Supreme Court 2 September 2019).  
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consuming for attorneys and demand scientific or other expertise. Victims are often unable 
to pay for these costs. Unless a forum provides for legal assistance, contingency fees, or 
another means of securing significant legal assistance, a victim’s only choice may be to 
find counsel elsewhere. The Court’s judgment indicates that this is a relevant factor when 
determining the appropriate forum, and it may even overcome competing issues of 
international comity. This may make it easier for victims to pursue multinational 
corporations in English courts.  
There are concerns that Lord Briggs’s approach could create a perverse incentive: 
parent companies might divest themselves of any responsibility for the operations of their 
subsidiaries. However, this is unlikely to become a standard, or even a dominant, practice 
amongst businesses. Parent companies claim responsibility over the practices of their 
subsidiaries because doing so provides them with clear advantages. First, many 
institutional investors demand their investees adopt and disclose their policies and 
practices. Businesses that fail to do so risk losing the support of these investors. Second, 
businesses in inherently dangerous industries, such as mining or oil and gas extraction, rely 
on their group-wide experiences and policies to secure licenses for new operations. By 
divesting from environmental and social oversight, businesses in their fields risk 
undermining their bids for new opportunities. Finally, developments at the national and 
international levels suggest the accountability gap is closing. France has adopted legislation 
requiring certain companies to undertake human rights due diligence.21 There are ongoing 
efforts to develop similar legislation for the EU, UK, Finland, and Switzerland. 
Internationally, states continue to debate a binding treaty on business and human rights that 
 
21
 Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des societies meres et des enterprises 
donneuses d’order.   
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would oblige states to adopt human rights due diligence. It may soon be unsustainable for 
large multinational corporations to refuse to meet the responsibilities established by the 
Guiding Principles throughout their corporate group. 
The decision may have even wider-reaching implications. As Lord Briggs 
explained, Vedanta did not owe a duty of care merely because it was KCM’s parent. Rather, 
that relationship provided an opportunity for the parent company to exercise oversight, and 
the parent company’s actions created the duty of care. One could envision similar outcomes 
with so-called “powerful or influential purchasers”22 or social auditors23 who assert that 
they supervise or audit for human rights abuses throughout their supply chains. Efforts to 
hold powerful purchasers accountable for human rights violations in their supply chains 
have been less successful than efforts at parent company responsibility. It appears that, to 
date, no court has found a purchaser responsible for human rights abuses in its supply chain. 
A claim against the German apparel company KiK for damages stemming from a fire at 
one of its Pakistani suppliers appeared promising,24 but was dismissed when the German 
court concluded Pakistani law provided for a two-year statute of limitations that could not 
be waived by the parties.25  
 It remains unclear how the UK’s impending exit from the European Union (which 
at the time of writing seems likely) might impact future decisions. When the UK leaves the 
 
22
 See, e.g., Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis and Sheldon Leader, Improving Paths to Business Accountability for 
Human Rights Abuses in the Global Supply Chain, ESSEX BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (2017) 7, 
available at https://www1.essex.ac.uk/ebhr/documents/Improving-Paths-to-Accountability-for-
Human%20Rights-Abuses-in-the-Global-Supply-chains-A-Legal-Guide.pdf (last accessed October 3, 2019). 
23
 For an argument that this duty of care already exists and should be recognized, see Tara Van Ho and 
Carolijn Terwindt, Assessing the Duty of Care for Social Auditors, 27 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 379 (2019). 
24
 The trial court awarded legal aid for the claimants upon a finding that they were more likely than not to 
succeed at trial. 
25
 For an English overview of the case, see KiK: Paying the Price for Clothing Production in South Asia, 
ECCHR, available at https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/kik-paying-the-price-for-clothing-production-in-south-
asia/ (last accessed October 3, 2019).   
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EU, it will cease to be bound by the Brussels Regulation. If, as is expected, the English 
courts revert to the common law approach to forum non conveniens, they would not be 
required to exercise jurisdiction over English companies when cases have extensive 
contacts with another jurisdiction. This could alter the balance of factors relevant to 
jurisdictional challenges, and encourage courts to use forum non conveniens more 
frequently to dismiss claims against parent companies for harms caused by the operations 
of their subsidiaries. For now, however, the Vedanta judgment opens up avenues for 
victims of corporate human rights abuses by clarifying two important issues in English law: 
parent companies can assume a duty of care for the impacts of their subsidiaries by issuing 
group-wide policies; and when evaluating whether a claimant can access “substantial 
justice” in another fora, English courts can and should consider whether the claimants can 
financially access appropriate legal counsel.   
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